American Success in Achieving Independence Essay

IntroductionThe British armed forces was considered the strongest in the universe at the outreach of contending between England and the American settlements in 1775. Britain had merely defeated France and the Indians in the Seven Years War and had attained its prominence as a world’s world power. Yet despite Britain’s overmastering military laterality. the British found themselves unable to repress General Washington and the American settlements.

The American’s success in accomplishing independency during the American Revolution was non due to General Washington’s strategic accomplishment but by legion British bloopers. The British errors during the Revolutionary war are: they ne’er had an overall scheme ; they failed to place the Center of Gravity. switching from violative scheme to a defensive scheme and deviating the war to the Southern settlements.Overall schemeThe British ne’er had an overall scheme for winning the Revolutionary War.

Best services for writing your paper according to Trustpilot

Premium Partner
From $18.00 per page
4,8 / 5
4,80
Writers Experience
4,80
Delivery
4,90
Support
4,70
Price
Recommended Service
From $13.90 per page
4,6 / 5
4,70
Writers Experience
4,70
Delivery
4,60
Support
4,60
Price
From $20.00 per page
4,5 / 5
4,80
Writers Experience
4,50
Delivery
4,40
Support
4,10
Price
* All Partners were chosen among 50+ writing services by our Customer Satisfaction Team

They acted watchfully at points when important and serious onslaughts could hold undermined the Continental ground forces. The British assumed that American rebellion would disintegrate when British military personnels lands on American shores. They believed that the Continental Army was inexpert and unable to contend a endless war against an organized British military force.

Not until after the Battle of Bunker did the British even begin to see in footings of war instead than merely rebellion. Britain surely non intended for a drawn-out war and invariably expected for the one polar triumph. The Continental Army was contending a domestic war while the British had to transport their military personnels from across the Atlantic. Contending against their ain countrymen was besides both a psychological and emotional disability for the British soldiers.The British military on a regular basis made errors. particularly General Howe. His laziness to take action at the start of the war made it likely for General Washington and the Continental Army to last. Happenings of hapless communicating and coaction between British commanding officers resulted in wasted occasions every bit good in Saratoga and Yorktown.

The constituent of period endlessly handicapped British manoeuvres. Communications both across the Atlantic and within the settlements were lingering and useless. Some commanding officers took affairs into their ain custodies and followed schemes that they felt best suited their immediate ends. The indecisiveness environing responses often led to indefensible cautiousness. unneeded holds. or unforeseeable chances in strategic state of affairss.

which finally demonstrated to be dearly-won. Because of the length of clip it took for communications. field conditions continually changed.

Failure to place the Center of GravityThe Americans had no discernible cardinal authorities and the British could non find a genuinely decisive Center of the Gravity ( COG ) . The COG is the hub of all power and motion. on which everything depends ( Clausewitz. pp. 595-596 ) . There was no COG that Britain could prehend and stop the war. There was no 1 that the British armed forces could get the better of that would rapidly convey about the forsaking of the full settler resistance. Throughout the run.

General Howe continued to let the Continental Army to retreat from the field without wholly destructing them. General Howe’s involuntariness to carry on a forceful chase and destruct General Washington’s Continental Army saved the Americans from a licking that could hold perchance ended the American Revolution. General Howe did non take into history that the Continental Army was the life of the rebellion and should hold been considered as the COG.The British dissipated an chance to bring down a destructive licking on the Continental ground forces at the Battle of Bunker Hill in June 1775. Although they strained the insurrectionists from the elevated field.

the British ground forces missed their opportunity to cover the rebellion a perchance black blow from the start. Another opportunity of devastation of the Continental Army came in August 1776. General Washington and the Continental Army had been routed in the Battle of Long Island and withdrew to the defences of Brooklyn Heights. which left them confined between Hessian and British military personnels and the East River. General Washington was able to maintain the revolution alive by keeping the Continental Army in the field.

Switching from violative scheme to a defensive schemeWithout Gallic aid. it is unsure that the American settlements could hold been a lucifer over Britain’s ample and well-equipped military. France clandestinely provided the American settlements with supplies and money. and upon officially declaring war on England in June 1778.

besides committed soldiers and naval fleets. With the Gallic fall ining the naval war. Britain switched from an violative scheme to a defensive scheme since their naval high quality is contested. Operationss in America became secondary to defence of the British Isles and larger economic involvements in the Caribbean.The ministry decided to support and strike the Gallic in West Indies.

which was regarded as more valuable than the American settlements. The British armed forcess had to be dispersed in several theatres and spread so thin across the Atlantic and no longer concentrated on the settlements. which accordingly lost the war in America ( Middlekauff. p.

438 ) . Britain’s failure to place cardinal locations to concentrate her Navy led to non able to procure their most strategically located districts and did non hold adequate military resources to go on the war in America. “With the defence therefore concentrated. England’s great arm. the Navy. should hold been smartly used on the offensive” ( Mahan. p.

394 ) .Deviating the war to the southern settlementsDuring the initial old ages of the American Revolutionary War. the initial military conflicts were in the North. The British changed their scheme to concentrate on the southern settlements as the leading felt that the South was home to many stalwarts where they could enlist their support and aid. England felt stalwarts in the South were oppressed by the radical authorities and would flock to them in support ( Mahan. p. 516 ) . Britain invariably pursued and hoped for Loyalist support but was ne’er received.

Furthermore. Britain besides decidedly did non make what was needed to derive and prolong the Loyalists’ support because they inclined to ignore the aid that the Loyalists contributed. In add-on. the British Parliament assumed that stalwarts would be a more daunting force and play a more effectual place in the war. The British was successful in most conventional conflicts fought in that part.

but American generals in the South turned to irregular and tip-and-run combat that finally thwarted the British military. The British should hold focused most of their forces on the Continental Army in the north alternatively of taking the South.Counter-ArgumentSome argue American independency might non hold won without the leading of General George Washington. He was honest. weather. and certain that the America and its Continental Army can win. He surely non gave up religion that he would make that object.

His first military triumph resulted in the British evacuating Boston in March 1776. General Washington reevaluated the wisdom of the tactical defensive and thenceforth avoided confrontations with big concentrations of enemy forces after unsuccessful defence of New York and following Philadelphia. General Washington came to realization that it was far more critical for him to keep the ground forces as an entity than it was to win any peculiar conflict or run ( Weigley. p. 12 ) .Alternatively of seeking to get the better of the British in one decisive action. General Washington instinctively realized that the revolution would last every bit long as the Continental ground forces survived. Washington had to stay non merely on the strategic defensive.

but often on the tactical defensive. every bit good. He right understood that. by maintaining his ground forces intact. he could maintain the revolution alive. If he could keep the war long plenty. Britain would wash up her resources and battle across the Atlantic and independency would be gained. Although General Washington lacked major triumphs in the Revolutionary war.

his celebrated two tactical successes. at Trenton and Princeton. were conducted against smaller concentrations of an enemy force. But. General Washington made a figure of first-class determinations at important times throughout the struggle.

DecisionBritain had an tremendous military advantage at the beginning of the American Revolution with immensely superior naval power and a professional armed forces with far greater fiscal resources. The British fought a much weaker enemy yet failed to carry through its military and political aims. General Washington recognized that the Continental Army was the anchor of the revolution.

the Center of Gravity. where the British failed to place. Another ground was the aid the Americans received from the Gallic. The British military were unusually odd and clearly the superior ground forces. and had the Gallic non provided assistance. it seems improbable that General Washington and the Continental Army could hold defeated the British.

They pulled together and were able to capitalise on the British’s bloopers.Bibliography1. Clausewitz.

C. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. explosive detection systems. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1989 2. Mahan.

A. T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. 1660-1783. New York: Dover. 1987.

3. Middlekauff. R.

The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution. 1763-1789. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. 4.

Weigley. R. F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1977.