Amid the Indo-Sino border disputes and trade deficit; Boycott or train the Dragon? The purpose of this paper is to show the economic interdependence between the two-nuclear armed major economies and the consequences that India can face with current voice of boycotting Chinese products; and to find the strategic solutions to tame the Dragon(China). The world’s two most populous countries, have a long and chequered history dating back thousands of years, but Since 2014, China has emerged as India’s biggest trading partner and a country with which India has a large trade deficit. Ultra-nationalist Indian politicians have been leading a campaign to boycott Chinese goods for the past two years and Chinese media had recently criticized India for imposing anti-dumping duties on more than 93 Chinese products following an article in “The Global Times”, part of the ruling Communist Party’s publication group said, “If India really starts a trade war with China, of course China’s economic interests will be hurt, but there will also be consequences for India”. What can be the solution? The notable findings from the previous research are From ages, China and India have had an as often as possible turbulent relationship. At the state level, imperative and optional relations between the two are loaded down with challenges, weights and apprehensions that various observers acknowledge will undoubtedly continue with the not all that far off.
The course of relations between these two countries along these lines has facilitate implications for whatever is left of the world by the sheer weight of numbers and degree of their geography. The portrayal of China as both a risk and opportunity seems to have driven India to embrace a considerably more nuanced point of view. Driven by globalists in the legislature and industry, the test from pragmatists and patriots on the developing unevenness in monetary relations to support China, appears to have been overseen effectively up until this point. “However, the inescapable fact is that at both the economic and strategic levels, there is an asymmetry of capabilities between India and China.” (Ollapally, DM,2014,357) The shift in China’s strategy while dealing with Sino-Indian boundary disputes can be effectively understood by evaluating the circumstances under which China has resolved its boundary disputes with other states. At present, there is no incentive for China to come to the negotiating table to resolve the boundary disputes. “Therefore, India should adopt a “carrot and stick” approach to convince China of the importance of resolving the disputes and to desist from aggressive posturing on the border.
” (Singh, N,2012,155) India needs to guarantee the local conditions of its unwavering quality as a financial and political accomplice as well as a security supplier. As the territorial adjust of energy in Asia changes and as the very lucidness of the ASEAN goes under inquiry, there will be new requests on India. The fast ascent of China in Asia and past is the principle turn even as India looks to grow financial coordination and reliance with the region.A strategy that India must comprise is to “include occasional and minor concessions to the PRC”, “a developing arrangement with Japan”, “the sporadic expansion of maritime collaboration with the United States, and the gradual development of its own military capacities. It might additionally include the quest for a more deliberate security exchange with the conditions of South-east Asia who share India’s tensions about China’s long haul aims.References1. Jain, S, & Shufen, Y 2011, ‘INDIA, CHINA: BROTHERS, BROTHERS’, Journal of International Affairs, 64, 2, pp.
259-267.2. Singh, N 2012, ‘How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India’s Foreign Policy Toward China’, India Review, 11, 3, pp.
139-160.3. Ollapally, DM 2014, ‘China and India: Economic Ties and Strategic Rivalry’, Orbis, 58, pp. 342-357.4. Pant, HV 2013, ‘China on the Horizon: India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Gathers Momentum’, Orbis, 57, pp. 453-466.5.
Ganguly, S, & Pardesi, M 2012, ‘Can China and India Rise Peacefully?’, Orbis, 56, pp. 470-485.