Themain reasons cited by Kuchi were: (i) the attitude of local commanders (41percent); (ii) the attitude of resident populations (17 percent); and (iii) theloss of pasture through conversion of those pastures or parts thereof tofarmland (13 percent). Overall 37 percent of Kuchi in the survey stated thatthey had con?icts of one kind or another with local populations regardingaccess to summer pastures.Thereis little doubt that the Kuchi-Hazara dispute has already reached a dangerouslevel.
Already in 2008 political leaders were voicing concern that civil warcould begin in areas which have so far not been directly involved in the ?ghtagainst Taliban insurgents. Hazara leaders meeting in June, and again in July2008, condemned Kuchi incursions, reiterated their ownership of the pastures ofHazarajat and urged the Government and the international community to disarmthe Kuchi. Accusations that the Kuchi are being directly armed by the Taliban(or even the Pakistan intelligence forces) are rife.
On their side, Kuchiaccuse Hazara of looking to Iran for assistance, Hazara sharing the Shia faithwith Iranians. Hazara acknowledge they need to arm themselves to protectagainst anticipated new attacks by Kuchi this year, but deny Iran is assisting.There is increasing concern that the dispute has the potential to develop intoa wider con?ict, with both sides arming and resorting to violence. Based onthese risks, a number of international organizations, including the FAO, USAID,UNEP, the World Bank and the Norwegian Refugee Council, have been working alongsidelocal stakeholders to help prevent and resolve con?icts over these pastures.
Source:UNEP, ‘Recommended Strategy for Con?ict Resolution of Competing High PastureClaims of Settled and Nomadic Communities in Afghanistan’, UNEP, Kabul, 2009.ECONOMICCHARACTERISTICSEconomic characteristics of most developing andconflict prone countries include:Ø Lowlevel and inadequate living standardsØ Low Levels of ProductivityØ HighRates of Population Growth and Dependency BurdensØ Highand Rising Levels of Unemployment and Under-EmploymentØ HeavyDependence on Agri-ProductionØ Shortageof CapitalItis often argued that risk of conflicts in low income countries is high becausepoor people have very little to lose in case they engage in wars hence rebelorganizations recruit them cheaply.This may not always be the case. However,indirectly, low income doesadvantage the rebels. Globally, the share of income which accrues to the government as tax revenue rises withincome.
For example, most governments getaround 40% of national income as tax revenue. In the really poor economies,like Ghana and Uganda in the early1980s, the government was only raising around 6% of national income as taxation. This shrinks thecapacity of the government to spend on defense, and so makes rebel predation easier. Indeed, in low-income economies,governments will naturally deriveabout half of their revenue from taxes on primary commodity exports (directly or indirectly) so that theirrevenue base is quite similar to that of the rebels. Thus, poor countries havea high frequency of conflict becausegovernments cannot defend. Of course, there might be other reasons why poverty makes it easier for rebels. Povertymight make people desperate or angry.
However, if this was an important effect we would expect to find thatinequality made conflict more likely:for a given level of average income, the more unequal is income distributionthe more severe the poverty of thepoorest. In fact, inequality does not seem to effect the risk of conflict. GREEDVERSUS GRIEVANCEThe greed versus grievance is a statistical model created by World Bankeconomist Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, an Oxford University researcherto determine whether greed or grievance-based motives caused the outbreak ofcivil wars between 1960 and 1999 in 161 states that weresurveyed”(Beswick and Jackson, 2011:41). The model had its findingspremised on economic accounts which explain rebellion in terms of opportunity(greed) as contrasted with political science literature which mainly explainsconflict in terms of motive (Grievance).
Collier-Hoeffler model madecomparisons of greed and grievance by way of using proxy measures in makingrepresentation of each of the concepts. With reference to substitutes foropportunity, collier and Hoeffler considered indicators of opportunity forfinancing rebellion which includes reliance and extortion of natural resources,donation from diasporas, donation from hostile governments, proportion of youngmales in the society and the average years of schooling, weak governmentmilitary capability and the favorability of the terrain as well as the extentof social cohesion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:3-6). In proxying objectivegrievances as the motive for civil conflict, the authors also consideredmeasures of grievance such as ethnic or religious hatred, political repression,political exclusion and inequality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:6-7). Based onthese proxy variables, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that “opportunity asan explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretationof rebellion as greed-motivated” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:17).
By this, theconclusion reached above suggested that